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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THOMAS PURVIS, 
Appellant. 
93 
[1] Homicide-Instructions-Punishment for First Degree Mur-
der.-The trial court in a first degree murder case properly 
~efused defendant's request to instruct the jury that in exer-
cising its discretion as to the appropriate penalty it was to 
consider only facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or, in 
the alternative, that only facts established by a preponderance 
of the evidence could be considered, and that, if it entertained 
a reasonable doubt as to which of the penalties to impose, the 
lesser penalty should be given. The jury has absolute discretion 
in fixing the penalty and is not required to prefer one penalty 
over another; in evaluating the evidence the jury was bound 
by the instructions given as to the limited purpose for which 
certain evidence was admitted, but beyond that it could draw 
its own inferences, determine the probative weight of evi-
dence, and select the appropriate penalty on the basis of its 
evaluation of the evidence. 
[2] Id. - Appea.1- Harmless Error - Exclusion of Evidence.-
Though the distinction between the paroling of a person con-
victed of two first degree murders and a person convicted of 
a second degree murder and then first degree murder would 
seem to be too fine to justify exclusion of testimony of an 
administrative officer for the Adult Authority, called by 
defendant in a first degree murder ease as an expert witness 
on the parole policies of the Adult Authority, as to how the 
Adult Authority had dealt with Il man convicted of murder, 
paroled, and then convicted of another murder, any error in 
excluding the testimony was not prejudicial, since evidence 
of a single example would not be sufficient by itself to show 
a general practice of the Adult Authority or how it would 
treat another recidivist murderer. 
[3] Criminal Law-Judgment-Determination of Punishment-
Procedure for Determining Penalty.-Although on trial of 
the penalty phase of a first degree murder ease there may be 
inquiry into relevant circumstances surrounding an earlier 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 323, 331; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§§ 501,580. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, §§ 237,238; [2] Homicide, 
§ 266; [3, 5, 6] Criminal Law, § 1011.1; [4] Criminal Law, § 657. 
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crime of which defendant was convicted, evidence of the 
earlier crime must meet the rules of admissibility governing 
proof of that crime or be otherwise properly admissible in 
the penalty proceeding. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Declarations and Conduct Respecting Accusa-
tion.-Where defendant's response in the face of an accusa-
tory statement is silence, evasion or equivocation, it is for thc 
trial court to determine in the first instance whether the 
accusation has been made under circumstances calling for a 
reply, whether he understood the statement, and whether his 
conduct or response was such as to give rise to an inference 
of acquiescence or guilty consciousness. 
[5] Id.-Judgment-Determination of Punishment-Procedure for 
Determining Penalty.-On trial of thc penalty phase of a first 
degree murder case, hearsay statements of defendant's second 
wife, for whose death defendant was convicted of second 
degree murder many years before, that she was afraid defend-
ant was going to kill her, that he had beaten her, had held 
her under water in a bathtub and deliberately burned her 
thigh and vagina with a cigarette, which testimony had not 
been introduced in that uxoricide trial, were not admissible 
to show her state of mind; any probative value such state of 
mind could have in determining the penalty for the murder 
of the other victim would be far outweighed by the highly 
prejudicial nature of the hearsay statements, and such state-
ments could readily lead the jury to believe that defendant 
was so depraved he deserved the death penalty. 
[6] Id.-Judgment-Determination of Punishment-Procedure for 
Determining Penalty.-On trial of the penalty phase of a first 
degree murder ease, hearsay statements of the victim that she 
was afraid of defendant because he had killed his wife were 
improperly admitted where, though it might be that an infer-
ence as to the victim's conduct could be drawn from her state 
of mind, no permissible inference could be drawn therefrom 
as to defendant's character or actions. Standing alone, the 
error might not be prejudicial but, consider~d with the error 
in admitting prejudicial hearsay statements of defendant's 
wife and the improper use of hearsay in the prosecutor's argu-
ment to the jury, the prosecutor having assumed that the 
wife's hearsay statements established the truth of the mat.ter 
asserted, the errors deprived defendant of a fair trial on the 
issue of penalty and compelled reverslll. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239. 
subd. (b), from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Allen G. Norris, Judge. Reversed with direc-
tions. 
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, reversed with directions for retrial of ques-
tion of penalty only. 
Martin N. Pulich, Public Defender, James C. Hooley and 
Thomas Francis Lyons, Assistant Public Defenders, for Appel-
lant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Arlo E. Smith and John 
S. McInerny, Deputy Attorneys General, J. Frank Coakley, 
District Attorney, and Frank Vukota, Deputy District Attor-
ney, for R~spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal is automatic from a judgment 
imposing the death penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
Defendant had been found guilty of the first degree murder of 
Hazel Wilson, and sentenced to death. The judgment was 
affirmed on appeal insofar as it adjudged defendant guilty, 
but reversed insofar as it imposed the death penalty. (People 
v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871,884-887 [346 P.2d 22]). Upon retrial 
the jury again fixed the penalty at death. 
Defendant contends that there was reversible error in the 
present proceeding because of the trial court's refusal to 
give certain requested instructions, its limiting the testimony 
of a defense witness, and its refusal to exclude certain hearsay 
testimony, and also because of misconduct of the prosecuting 
attorney. 
[1] Defendant requested the trial court to instruct the 
jury that in exercising its discretion as to the appropriate 
penalty it was to consider only facts proved beyond a reason-
able doubt.1 He requested an alternative instruction that only 
facts established by a preponderance of the evidence could 
be considered.2 He also requested the court to instruct the 
'The relevant part of the requested instruction (No.9) is: "You may 
consider such facts in arriving at your decision as to what is the 
defendant's history and background which operate in aggraV'ation or 
mitigation. However, those facts which tend to show aggravation may 
only be considered by you if you are convinced, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that such facts have been proved. If you entertain a reason· 
able doubt that such facts have not been proved, then you should not 
consider all facts of the circumstances surrounding the crime or of the 
proper penalty." 
-The relevant part of requested instruction number nine alternate 
SUbstitutes the words "a preponderance of evidence" for "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
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jury that if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to which of 
the penalties to impose, the lesser penalty should be given.8 
The court properly refused to give the requested instruc-
tions. The jury has absolute discretion in fixing the penalty 
and is not required to prefer one penalty over another. 
(People v~ Jones, 52 Ca1.2d 636, 648-649 [343 P.2d 577]; 
People v. Brice, 49 Ca1.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d 961].) In evalu-
ating the evidence the jury was bound by the instructions 
given as to the limited purpose for which certain evidence was 
admitted, but beyond that it could draw its own inferences, 
determine the probative weight of evidence, and select the 
appropriate penalty on the basis of its evaluation of the evi-
dence. (People v. Brust, 47 Ca1.2d 776, 787-790 [306 P.2d 
480]; People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 767-768 [306 P.2d 
463].) 
[S] Joseph Spangler, an administrative officer for the 
California Adult Authority, was called as a witness for the 
defendant as an expert on the parole policies of the Adult 
Authority. He testified to the median time spent in prison 
by first degree murderers who had been paroled. He was then 
asked whether he had any information as to the parole of a 
person who had been convicted of murder, paroled, and con-
victed of another murder. Mr. Spangler answered that he 
knew of one such person, but the trial court did not allow him 
to tell the jury about that person since he had been convicted 
of two first degree murders and not of a second degree murder 
followed by a first degree murder. Three times the jury 
returned to the courtroom to ask about parole procedure, and 
at one of those times asked to have the entire transcript of 
:Mr. Spangler's testimony read to them. Defendant contends 
that it was proper for the jury to hear evidence as to how 
the Adult Authority would deal with a man twice convicted 
of murder (People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 885 [346 P.2d 
22]), and that the interest of the jury in parole procedure 
indicated that the court's error in excluding that evidence 
was prejudicial. 
"'The Court instructs you that if you entertain a reasonable doubt 
as to which of the two or more punishments should be imposed, it is 
your duty to impose the lesser. 
"In determining which punishment shall be inllicted, you are entirely 
free to act according to your own judgment. 
"If any individual juror, or the jury as a whole, entertains a reason· 
able doubt as to which of two or more punishments should be imposed, 
it is your duty to impose the lesser of the two." (Requested instruc-
tion No. 12.) 
) 
) 
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The distinction between the paroling of a person convicted 
of . two first degree murders and a person convicted of a 
sec.ond degree murder and then first degree murder would 
seem to be too fine to justify exclusion of the offered testimony. 
Any error, however, in excluding the testimony was not 
prejudicial, for evidence of a single example would not be 
sufficient by itself to show a general practice of the Adult 
Authority or how it would treat another recidivist murderer. 
Over defendant's objections hearsay statements were ad-
mitted of Eleanor Purvis, defendant's second wife, for whose 
death defendant had previously been found guilty of second 
degree murder. Officers testified that Eleanor Purvis had 
made statements to them that she was afraid defendant was 
going to kill her, that defendant had beaten her, had held her 
under water in a bathtub, and deliberately burned her thigh 
and vagina with a cigarette. None of this testimony had been 
introduced at defendant's trial in 1950 for the murder of 
Eleanor Purvis~ 
[3] Although there may be "inquiry into relevant cir-
cumstances surrounding an earlier crime of which the defend-
ant was convicted" (People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 881 [346 
P.2d 22]), evidence of the earlier crime must meet the rules 
of admissibility governing proof of that crime or be otherwise 
properly admissible in the penalty proceeding. The attorney 
general contends that some of the hearsay statements of 
Eleanor Purvis can be admitted against defendant as his 
adoptive admissions. There was conflicting testimony whether 
defendant was present when the statements were made. 
[4] Even if he were present, "Where his response,is silence, 
evasion, or equivocation, it is for the trial court to determine 
in the first instance whether the accusation has been made 
under circumstances calling for a reply, whether the accused 
understood the statement, and whether his conduct or response 
was such as to give rise to an inference of acquiescence or 
guilty consciousness." (People v. Simmons, 28 Ca1.2d 699, 
712 [172 P.2d 18] ; see People v. Davis, 43 Cal.2d 661, 670 
[276 P.2d 801] ; McBaine, California Evidence Manual2d ed., 
§ 934.) There is no evidence that would support such a deter-
mination. Furthermore there were no instructions given to 
the jury 011 evaluating adoptive admissions. 
The Attorney General invokes People v. Merkouris, 52 
Ca1.2d 672, 682 [344 P.2d 1], and People v. Atchley, 53 Ca1.2d 
160. 172 [346 P.2d 764], for the proposition that the hearsay 
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. Eleanor Purvis. In the Merkouris ease, the victims' state-
ments indicating fear of the defendant were admitted to 
identify the defendant as the killer. In the Atchley ease, 
. the statement was admissible on the issue of self-defense. 
In the trial for the murder of Eleanor Purvis neither the 
identification of defendant as the killer nor a claim of self-
defense was in issue. Nor had defendant put in issue any 
other fact to which the hearsay statements were relevant. 
Defendant's defense in that trial was that he acted without 
premeditation and was therefore guilty of second degree 
murder only. Thus, even on the issue of guilt the state ·of 
mind of the victim would not have been relevant. [ 5 ] In 
the present case the hearsay statements of Eleanor Purvis 
were admitted, not merely to establish defendant's guilt of her 
murder but to influence the jury in a separate proceeding to 
determine the penalty for a subsequent murder. In determin-
ing the penalty for the murder of Hazel Wilson the state of 
miud of Eleanor Purvis has no probative value. Certainly 
any probative value it could conceivably have would be far 
outweighed by the highly prejudicial nature of the hearsay 
statements. Eleanor Purvis did not merely say she feared 
defendant. She related beatings and acts that could readily 
lead the jury to believe that defendant was so depraved he 
deserved the death penalty. 
[6] Defendant contends that certain hearsay statements 
of Hazel Wilson were also improperly admitted. Witnesses 
testified that Hazel Wilson had told them that she was afraid 
of defendant because he had killed his wife. In the trial for 
the murder of Hazel Wilson defendant also claimed that he 
had killed without premeditation. There was no issue of 
either identification or self-defense. There was thus no ground 
on which Hazel Wilson's fear of defendant could be admitted 
even to prove defendant's guilt let alone to aid the jury in 
fixing the penalty. It may be that an inference as to the 
victim's conduct can be drawn from the victim's state of 
mind, but certainly no permissible inference can be drawn 
therefrom as to defendant's character or actions. Standing 
alone, the error in admitting this evidence might not be preju-
dicial. Considered, however, with the error in admitting the 
highly prejudicial hearsay statements of Eleanor Purvis and 
the improper use of the hearsay in the prosecutor's argument : 
to the jury the conclusion is inescapable that the purpose of 
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Thc prosecutor argued to the jury as if the hearsay state-
ments of Eleanor Purvis established the truth of the matter 
asserted, although those statements had been admitted only 
to show her state of mind toward defendant. In both his 
opening and closing arguments the prosecutor stated that 
defendant would take lighted cigarettes and burn Eleanor 
Purvis' thighs and her vaginal tract. These highly inflamma-
tory statements of defendant's conduct could only have been 
made to persuade the jury that defendant was such a depraved 
person he deserved the death penalty. The prosecutor's argu-
ment thus served to compound the original error in admitting 
these hearsay statements. Even if. they could be admitted to 
show Eleanor Purvis' state of mind, the prosecutor's assump-
tion in his argument that they were true would far exceed 
the bounds of proper argument. Particularly when guilt has 
been established and the question is one of life imprisonment 
or death must strict standards of fairness be observed. The 
serious errors both in the admission of evidence and the 
highly prejudicial misconduct of the prosecutor in his argu-
ment to the jury. deprived defendant of a fair trial on the 
issue of penalty and therefore compel a reversal. The judgment 
imposing the death penalty is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded. for retrial and redetermination of the question of 
penalty only and for the pronouncement of a new sentence 
and judgment in accordance with such determination and the 
applicable law. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-For reasons 
hereinafter explained I concur in the judgment but in the 
interest of more helpful and accurate guidance of the trial 
court on the new trial (this is a second reversal) I would 
modify the majority opinion in certain respects. I would 
amend and augment the opinion to more adequately define (for 
instruction of the jury at the penalty stage of a trial) the 
difference between the burdens of (a) proof and (b) per-
suasion in, respectively, (1) the process of evaluating conflict-
ing evidence to determine whether the existence of particular 
facts has been proved and (2) the process of exercising abso-
lute discretion to determine the ultimate issue of selecting the 
penalty. Furthermore, I think a reading of the transcript 
demonstrates the untenability of, and I would delete, the hold-
ing that •• There is no evidence that would support . . . a 
) 
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determination" that any of the hearsay statements of Eleanor 
Purvis were admissible. 
In more detail, my views in this matter and the reasons 
therefor, are as follows: 
Defendant's first requested instruction as to burden of 
proof at the penalty stage of the triaP was properly refused 
because it would have required that facts in aggravation of 
punishment be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and would 
have left the jury uninstructed as to whether there was any 
burden of proof of facts in mitigation. Similarly, defendant's 
alternative requested instruction on the subject2 would have 
created the erroneous impression that, while the jury could 
consider aggravating facts only if they were proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence, therc was no burden of proof 
IlS to mitigating facts. 
As the majority say (ante, p. 96 [13 Cal.Rptr. 803, 362 
P.2d 715]), "The jury has absolute discretion in fixing 
the penalty and is not required to prefer one penalty over 
another." And at the penalty stage of trial there is-no burden 
of producing evidence. The instructions given here apprised 
the jury of these concepts,S but did not tell them about any 
burden of persuasion, or risk of nonpersuasion, of facts. 
In my opinion there is a burden of proof of facts, if either 
party seeks to prove them, at the penalty stage of trial as in 
any other adversary proceeding; and there is a difference 
'The relevant part of the instrnction (quoted by the majority also 
in their f.n. 1) is: "those facts which tend to show aggravation may 
only be considered by you if you are convinced, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that such facts have been proved. If you entertain a reasonable 
doubt that sucll facts have not been pro'l"ed, then you SllOUld not con-
sider such facts in arriving at your decision as to what is the proper 
penalty." (Italics added.) The italicized "not" appears to have been 
inserted by clerical error. 
'The pertinent part of such instruction is: "those facts which tend 
to show aggravation may only be considered by you if you are eon-
yinced that such facts have been proved by a preponderance of evi-
dence. If you are not convinced that sueh facts are proved by a 
preponderance of evidence then you should not consider them in arriv-
ing at your decision as to what is the proper penalty." 
"The jury were told: 
"In determining which punishment shall be inflicted, you are entirely 
free to act according to your own judgment and absolute discretion. 
The discretion of determining which punishment shall be imposed is 
vested in the jury alone. In this determination it is your duty to 
conscientiously consider all of the evidence of the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history and 
of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty which hnve 
been presented to you here in court, weiglling and considering the 
evidenc.e under the applicable rule of law which was given to you in 
the Court's instructions in this ease. [As stated, there was no instruc· 
) 
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between the process of the jury's evaluating conflicting evi-
dence to determine whether the existence of particular facts 
have been proved, and thc process of their exercising absolute 
discretion to determine the ultimate issue of selecting thc 
. penalty. 
The trier of the issue of penalty does not have to find the 
existence of mitigating circumstances in order to select the 
punishment of life imprisonment, or the existence of aggra-
vating circumstances in order to fix the punishment at death. 
The ultimate determination need not rest on the resolution 
of any question of fact in the traditional sense in which such 
questions are usually presented in a lawsuit. The selection 
of penalty may be based on matters such as the following, 
which are not proved as facts but rest in the judgment and 
consciences, the minds and hearts, of the jury; "considera-
tions of the several objectives of punishment, of the deter-
rence of crime, of the protection of society, of the desirability 
of stern retribution, or of sympathy or clemency . . . or of 
the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of death, or an 
apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have 
not been brought to light .... " (People v. Friend (1957), 
47 Cal.2d 749, 768 [306 P.2d 463] ; People v. Jones (1959), 
52 Ca1.2d 636, 649 [7] [343 P.2d 577].) 
Although a jury could properly, for example, disbelieve 
all the evidence introduced by the People in aggravation, 
believe all the evidence introduced by the defendant in miti-
gation, and yet impose the death penalty because of "extra-
evidentiary" factors such as those just recited, I think its 
original evaluation of the evidencc (before it reached its final 
task of selecting punishment) would have to be guided by 
the concept of burden of proof. I know of no other manner 
in which the evidence could be weighed, and I doubt that 
anyonc would contend that at the penalty stage of trial the 
evidence could bc arbitrarily ignored. 
It has been held that where the selection of penalty is madc 
by the jury, the proceeding should be a trial in the full 
Hon concerning weighing the evidence as to the existence of particular 
facts in the light of any burden of proof.] ... 
"The choice as between the two penalties is in every ease committed 
to the jury's absolute discretion .•.• 
"With respect to the penalty, no burden of proof is east upon tho 
People or the Defendant to show by any particular quantum, that is 
amount, of evidence which penalty should be imposed by 3'0u. You 
are further instructed that you must agree unanimously on the penalty 
which is to be imposed in this partirulnr ease, which unanimous deei-
lion .honld be indicated by your verdict." (Italics added.) 
) 
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technical sense, governed by the same rules of procedure as 
the trial of the issue of guilt. (People v. Purtlis (1959), 52 
Cal.2d 871, 883-884 [12] [346 P.2d 22]; People v. Green 
(1956),47 Cal.2d 209, 236 [16] [302 P.2d 307].) That hold-
ing concerned the requirement that only competent evidence 
be received, but to me it also contemplates the concept of 
burden of proof-although not the same burden which is 
imposed on the People at thc trial of the issue of guilt, when 
there is a presumption of defendant's innocence-and instruc-
tions explaining the applicable burden. 
In the present case, the People presented evidence of in-
stances of reprehensible conduct of defendant antedating and 
apart from the subject murder, and the defendant presented 
evidence that those instances did not occur. Before the jury 
could intelligently decide-in their absolute discretion, to be 
sure-what penalty defendant should sufier, they would have 
to determine whether the aggravating events took place. That 
determination, I think, should have been made under guid-
ance of instructions that the People had the burden of proving 
aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence. And 
where defendant presents evidence of mitigating circumstances 
I think the jury should be told that he has the burden of 
proving such circumstances by a similar preponderance. 
I am further of the opinion that the jury should have been 
instructed that if they entertained a reasonable doubt as to 
which penalty should be imposed, they should select the lesser. 
Such an instruction (which would accord with a dictum in 
People v. Oancino (1937), 10 Ca1.2d 223, 230 (3] [73 P.2d 
1180] ), would not concern the burden of proof of issues of 
fact. Rather, it would be a proper application of the more 
general rule that "The defendant is entitled to the benefit of 
every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question 
of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the con-
struction of language used in a statute." (In re Tartar 
(1959), 52 Ca1.2d 250, 257 [10] [339 P.2d 553].) The in-
struction requested by defendant in this regard,' however, 
"The requested instruction (quoted by the majority in their f. n. 3) 
is: 
"The Court instructs you that if you entertain a reasonable doubt 
as to which of the two or more punishments should be imposed, it is 
your duty to impose the lesser. 
"In determining which punishment aha11 be in:fticted, you are entirely 
free to act according to your own judgment. 
"If tmy i7ldividllaZ juror, or the jury as a whole, entertains a reason-
able doubt as to which of two or more punishments ahould be imposed, 
it is your duty to impose the lesser of the two." (Italics added.) 
June 1961] PEOPLE V. PURVIS 
[118 C.M 13; 13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.Id 711] 
103 
could not properly have been given in its entirety, for its 
last paragraph would have incorrectly told the jury that if 
a single juror had a reasonable doubt as to which punish-
. ment should be inflicted, it would be the duty of the entire 
. jury to yield to his opinion and impose the lesser penalty. 
Rather, in such a situation, it would be the duty of the jury 
to report to the trial judge their inability (if such was the 
fact) to reach a unanimous verdict on the issue of penalty. 
The judge should then C C dismiss the jury and either impose 
the punishment for life in lieu of ordering a new trial on 
the issue of penalty, or order a new jury impaneled to try 
the issue of penalty." (Pen. Code, § 190.1.) 
I am also not entirely in accord with the majority's dis-
cussion of the testimony of police officers who related the 
contents of accusatory statements made by defendant's wife 
Eleanor on various occasions during the six months prior to 
her murder by defendant on February 6, 1950. The evidence 
would support a determination that on one or two occasions 
when Eleanor stated that defendant had struck her or bruised 
her, defendant was present and did not deny the accusations. 
I (lannot agree with the majority (ante, p. 97) that there 
is no evidence which would support a determination that 
those accusations were understood by defendant and made in 
circumstances calling for a reply, and that defendant's failure 
to deny them could give rise to an inference that he admitted 
their truth. Eleanor's statements were made to police officers 
who had been summoned by a report of a cc family disturb-
ance"; certainly such a situation would normally call for 
some reply by the asserted creator of the disturbance. There 
is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant lacked 
ordinary capacity to understand the accusations (his own 
testimony belies such a suggestion) or that his silence was 
the result of coercion. In the circumstances I find no preju-
dice in the lack of literal compliance with the foundational 
requirement that the trial judge determine "in the first 
instance" whether the accusations were made in a situation 
which would support an inference of admissions by silence 
(People v. Simmo'M (1946), 28 Ca1.2d 699, 712 [6a] [172 
P.2d 18]) or in the failure to instruct the jury concerning 
such admissions. 
I agree that the more damaging statements that defendant 
held Eleanor's head under water and deliberately burned 
her with a cigarette were inadmissible hearsay. There is no 
evidence that defendant was present when Eleanor made 
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these accusations and their scope went far beyond that neces-
sary to show a relevant state of mind of the victim. People v. 
Merkouris (1959), 52 Cal.2d 672, 682 [10-12] [344 P.2d 1], 
should not be extended (and People v. Feasby (1960), 178 
Cal.App.2d 723, 733-734 [14-17] [3 Cal.Rptr. 230] should not 
'be construed) to permit the introduction in evidence, without 
discrimination, of all sorts of accusations against a defendant 
by the victim of a homicide, upon the theory that the victim's 
state of mind is relevant. 
However, I cannot agree with the broad statement of the 
majority (ante, p. 98) that in the trial of defendant for 
the murder of Eleanor •• on the issue of guilt the state of 
mind of the victim would not have been relevant." In that 
trial the prosecution might not have foreseen that the sole 
defense would be an attempt to show that defendant killed 
without premeditation. Defendant's plea of not guilty put 
in issue the identity of the killer as well as every element 
of the crime of murder. (Pen. Code, § 1019.) I am not pre-
pared to say, on the basis of hindsight,that because defendant 
did not, at the trial for Eleanor's murder, testify that he 
was not the killer, therefore the prosecution could not have 
proved Eleanor's fear of defendant, by her declarations 
appropriately limited (see People v. Burton (1961), 55 
Ca1.2d 328, 348-349 [20-22] [11 Cal.Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 
433J), in order to show the probability that she was killed 
by defendant rather than some unidentified third person. 
Also I am not prepared to say that evidence that a previous 
wife, particularly one killed by defendant, feared him for 
some time before her death, has no probative value in the 
determination of penalty for the subsequent killing of a 
paramour. But in the instant case the manner in which the 
district attorney used the statements of Eleanor suggests 
that he deliberately presented inadmissible hearsay concern-
ing prior depraved conduct of defendant, with full awareness 
of the impropriety of such evidence. The prosecuting attorney 
should have known when he made his opening statement what 
the tenor of the testimony of the experienced police officers 
would be. Certainly at the end of the taking of evidence, 
after repeated colloquies among the trial judge and counsel 
concerning the matter, the prosecutor knew that he had not 
presented any admissible evidcnce that defendant attempted 
to drown Eleanor and burned her with a cigarette on occasions 
prior to her murder. Yet both the prosecution's opening 
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statement and its closing arguments assumed the truth of the 
subject hearsay. 
On almost every occasion when the officers' testimonies 
as to Eleanor's declaration were given the trial judge was 
commendably careful to instruct the jury that the evidence 
was received only to show her state of mind and not to show 
the truth of other facts declared by her. But in the circum-
stances I do not believe that the admonitions of the judge 
could cure the prejudicial effect of the incompetent evidence. 
I do not imply that I think the penalty selected by the jury 
is not fully warranted by the properly admitted and com-
petent evidence. In an ultimate sense, if we could consider 
only the admissible evidence and the verdict, we should 
properly conclude that no miscarriage of justice appears. 
But such a limited consideration of the record does not meet 
California's standard of justice. The elements of procedural 
due process are as essential to a valid judgment as is proof 
of the facts constituting the crime. If any evidence on the 
issue of penalty is to be received it must be competent evidence, 
not prejudicial hearsay. I agree with the majority that the 
compounding of error in receiving incompetent evidence and 
the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney require reversal 
and remand for a new trial on the sole issue of penalty. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
